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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of link formation between a pair of agents on the
resource availability of other agents (that is, externalities) in a social cloud network,
a special case of endogenous sharing economy networks. Specifically, we study how
the closeness between agents and the network size affect externalities.
We conjecture, and experimentally support, that for an agent to experience pos-
itive externalities, an increase in its closeness is necessary. The condition is not
sufficient though. We, then, show that for populated ring networks, one or more
agents experience positive externalities due to an increase in the closeness of agents.
Further, the initial distance between agents forming a link has a direct bearing on
the number of beneficiaries, and the number of beneficiaries is always less than that
of non-beneficiaries.
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1. Introduction
The sharing economy (Puschmann and Rainer 2016) is not free from externalities,
the effects of actions of individual agents on other agents. Studies (for example, Jing
and Sun (2018)) have investigated externalities and its sources in the sharing econ-
omy. However, these studies have mainly focused on platform-mediated sharing models
where consumers and providers are matched. Numerous studies have looked at shar-
ing platforms with negative externalities (Katz 2015; Cohen and Sundararajan 2017;
Frenken and Schor 2017) and with positive externalities too (Basselier, Langenus, and
Walravens 2018).
Externalities in endogenous network formation are usually studied in determining
which network structure is likely to emerge, and to understand the tension between
network stability and its efficiency (Buechel and Hellmann 2012). However, in this
paper, we study externalities with a different motivation — to study how closeness
and network size affect externalities.
To study the above aspects, we consider the social cloud model proposed by Mane,
Ahuja, and Krishnamurthy (2014), a sharing economy network (Georgiadis, Iosifidis,
and Tassiulas 2017), different from platform-mediated sharing models and endoge-
nously formed. On the one hand, we have online data backup services like Buddy-
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Backup1 and CrashPlan2, which are examples of such social clouds, where two agents
share or trade resources directly with each other, without an intermediary third-party.
On the other hand, we have traditional cloud service providers like Amazon’s AWS S33
and Microsoft’s Azure4, which are examples of players in a horizontal market where
different cloud providers compete for customer requests of computational resources.
2. Social Cloud Model
A social cloud g is a storage or computational resource sharing network of N agents
connected by L links, that evolves endogenously when agents build their resource
sharing connections. According to Chard et al. (2012), agents could limit resource
sharing with friends who are close to them. Mane, Ahuja, and Krishnamurthy (2014)
capture this closeness by using the harmonic centrality measure (Boldi and Vigna
2014), as
Φi(g) =
∑
j∈g\{i}
1
dij(g)
,
where dij(g) is the distance between agents i and j, that is, the length of any shortest
path between them.
Similar to Mane, Ahuja, and Krishnamurthy (2014), we define the probability that
agent i obtains a resource from j as
αij(g) =
1
dij(g)
Φj(g)
.
The probability that agent i will get the resource from at least one agent in the network
g is
γi(g) = 1−
∏
j∈g
(1− αij(g)).
Based on the definition of externalities by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we define the
following for the social cloud model.
Definition 2.1. Suppose g is a social cloud, with distinct agents i, j, k such that
〈jk〉 /∈ g. If j and k add a link, the resulting network denoted by g + 〈jk〉, then i
experiences
(1) no externalities if γi(g + 〈jk〉) = γi(g),
(2) negative externalities if γi(g + 〈jk〉) < γi(g), and
(3) positive externalities if γi(g + 〈jk〉) > γi(g).
1buddybackup.com
2crashplan.com
3aws.amazon.com/s3
4azure.microsoft.com
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Our objective is to investigate the impact of a newly added link 〈jk〉 in g on the
relation between changes in
(1) Φi and γi,
(2) N , djk and γi,
for all i ∈ g.
3. Findings
3.1. Externalities and Closeness
On first glance, it seems that the harmonic centrality would lead to only negative exter-
nalities. However, a careful analysis reveals that both positive and negative externali-
ties are exhibited. This is an important motivation of our study. Consider the network
g (Figure 1(a)). On adding link 〈jk〉, we get g+ 〈jk〉 (Figure 1(b)). γi(g+ 〈jk〉)−γi(g)
(a) Network g (b) Network g+ 〈jk〉
Figure 1. Example: Externalities and Closeness
provides a basis for the study of externalities. As shown in Table 1, the link 〈jk〉 is
advantageous for agents f and g (shown in blue), and for j and k themselves, but
disadvantageous for the remaining agents (shown in red).
agent (x) Φx(g) γx(g) Φx(g + 〈jk〉) γx(g + 〈jk〉) γx(g + 〈jk〉)− γx(g)
a 6.25 0.654 6.25 0.646 -0.008
b 6.25 0.654 6.33 0.650 -0.004
c 6.25 0.654 6.33 0.650 -0.004
d 6.25 0.654 6.25 0.646 -0.008
e 6.25 0.654 6.25 0.644 -0.011
f 6.25 0.654 6.50 0.657 0.003
g 6.25 0.654 6.50 0.657 0.003
h 6.25 0.654 6.25 0.644 -0.011
i 6.25 0.654 6.25 0.637 -0.017
j 6.25 0.654 7.00 0.687 0.033
k 6.25 0.654 7.00 0.687 0.033
l 6.25 0.654 6.25 0.637 -0.017
Table 1. Externalities and Closeness
Observation 1. Addition of a link (〈jk〉, above) results in the same closeness for
some agents (for example, h and i) and an increased closeness for the others (for
example, b and c). Addition of a link cannot decrease the closeness of any agent, and
always increases the closeness of the agents who add the link (j and k).
3
Conjecture 1. For an agent to experience positive externalities, an increment in its
closeness is necessary.
Finding 1. For an agent to experience positive externalities, an increment in its
closeness is not a sufficient condition. For example, although the closeness of agents
b and c increases, their chance of obtaining a resource does not improve.
3.2. Network Size Analysis
For our second objective, we focus on the ring network with sizes varying from 4 to
30 agents, considered reasonably large in the literature on experimental research on
economic networks (Choi, Gallo, and Kariv 2016). Very large networks may encode a
very limited amount of information (Chandrasekhar 2016).
We focus on the ring network as its harmonic centrality is uniform. This helps us
investigate the relation between externalities and network size.
To obtain data, we adopt a single computer program-based simulation (Naylor,
Burdick, and Sasser 1967; Friedman and Cassar 2004) method due to unavailability
of data of real world networks like BuddyBackup or CrashPlan, and because of the
endogeneity issue (Choi, Gallo, and Kariv 2016) faced by various studies.
We, initially, compute γi(g) for all agents in a ring network g. Then, we select an
agent j arbitrarily and add a link with another agent k whose distance is two hops from
j. We compute γi(g+ 〈jk〉)−γi(g), and count the number of beneficiaries (NOB) i for
whom this difference is positive. We repeat the above for all agents k who are located
at distance two hops from agent j in g. Then, we increment the distance between j
and k by one and follow the same procedure. We do this until we exhaust all agents j.
Figure 2 summarises our results. The x-axis represents the shortest distance be-
tween two agents involved in link formation. The y-axis represents the NOB. The
z-axis represents the network size (the number of agents in the network).
Finding 2. In “less” populated ring networks, no agent experiences positive external-
ities.
In networks with size varying from 4 to 10 (Figure 2(a)), no agent experiences
positive externalities. From Conjecture 1, positive externalities require an increase in
closeness, which is absent here. However, from network size 11 to 30 ( Figures 2(b)
and 2(c)), a significant number of agents experience positive externalities.
Finding 3. In ring networks of size greater than 10, as the distance between the agents
involved in link addition increases, the number of beneficiaries increases in most cases,
and in all cases for small distances.
Plots in Figures 2(b), 2(c) and 2(d) are of this type. It is clear that, if an agent
experiences positive externalities, its closeness should increased (from Conjecture 1).
This is intuitive — if a pair of agents who are far from each other in g form a link
then, this link reduces the mutual distances among other agents, and therefore, their
closeness increase. As discussed in Finding 1, an increase in closeness is not a sufficient
condition for positive externalities. We believe that an increase in closeness together
with some conditions will always imply positive externalities, and leave open this
question of finding the other conditions of sufficiency.
Finding 4. In ring networks, the number of beneficiaries is always less than the
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(a) Network Size 4-10 (b) Network Size 11-20
(c) Network Size 21-30 (d) Network Size 22-24
Figure 2. Externalities and Network-Size
number of non-beneficiaries.
In all our experiments, the percentage of beneficiaries varies from 0% to 26% of the
total number of agents in the network.
4. Conclusion
Though our investigations are on a small scale, our findings have many applications
and implications. Our study enhances our understanding of externalities in the sharing
economy network model. Our findings show that network size is also a key factor in
determining externalities.
Our approach of relating externalities and group well-being (that is, measuring
the percentage of beneficiaries versus non-beneficiaries) enriches the transfer-based
network formation model (where agents subsidise others to form or not to form a
link with others), (Bloch and Jackson 2007) by incorporating group subsidisation. In
particular, agents can subsidize a pair of agents involved in a link formation, instead
of individual subsidization. For example, in some research and development settings,
where a set of beneficiary-firms are willing to pay a pair of firms that would like to
collaborate (Jackson 2008). Using the approach and results discussed in the paper,
one can model this situation either as collective subsidization or as bargaining on link
formation. In this case, a set of non-beneficiary-firms will pay for the pair of firms to not
collaborate with each other, or a set of beneficiary-firms will pay for the pair of firms
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to collaborate with each other. Alternatively, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
may bargain for link formation.
Our result regarding the network size and the distance between agents can be used
to formulate resource allocation policy in social clouds. Specifically, the policy may
include the use (or recommendation) of friends as backup partners, so as to avoid
negative externalities or minimize the number of non-beneficiaries (for example, by
choosing agents for data backup who are far away from the agent requesting backup).
Although our results are for ring networks, they can be extended to other network
structures too.
Existing literature has not looked at resource availability in social networks where
links (connections) are endogenously formed. We believe that our study is a first step
towards enhancing our understanding of externalities in social clouds, and hence in
endogenous sharing economy networks.
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